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Abstract This paper answers a long-standing open question (Bruss (1984)) con-
cerning the optimality of the 1/e-strategy for the problem of best choice under no
information on the number of options. We give the background of this open problem
and explain why the no-information hypothesis has intriguing aspects, suggesting
that the problem may be ill-posed. Moreover, we will explain why these aspects had
distracted for a long time from the essence of the problem. Then comes the main
contribution of this paper. We show that the open problem is well-posed and then
prove that the 1/e-strategy is indeed optimal, and even the only optimal strategy.
The main tools for the affirmative answer are generalized versions of the Odds-
Theorem which we prove first, and, in particular, the ageless beautiful theorem of
relative ranks of Re´nyi (1962).
In a short discussion we also argue that problems of optimal control and/or
optimal stopping under the no-information hypothesis may lead to another interest-
ing question: What would be a versatile and solid definition of optimality for more
general stopping problems including those which, by definition, do not have a value?
Keywords Optimal stopping, Secretary problem, Stopping times, No-information,
Well-posed problem, Proportional increments, Re´nyi’s theorem of relative ranks,
Generalised Odds-theorem, Poisson process, k-record process, Pascal process.
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1 Dedication and background
At the evening of Professor Larry Shepp’s talk “Reflecting Brownian Motion” at
Cornell University on July 11, 1983 (13th Conference on Stochastic Processes and
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Applications), Larry and I ran into each other in front of the Ezra Cornell statue.
I was honored to meet him in person, and Larry replied “What are you working
on?” And so Professor Shepp was the very first person with whom I could discuss
the 1/e-law of best choice resulting from the Unified Approach (B. (1984)) which
had been accepted for publication shortly before. I was glad to see the true interest
Professor Shepp showed for the 1/e-law. As many of us know, when Larry was
interested in a problem, elementary or not, then he was deeply interested.
This article deals with an open question concerning the optimality of the so-called
1/e-strategy for the problem of best choice under no information on the number N
of options. I drew again attention to this open question in my own talk “The e−1-
law in best choice problems” at Cornell on July 14, 1983, and re-discussed it with
Larry at several later occasions. The first written record of this question appears
on page 885 of B.(1984): “It is conjectured that the e−1-strategy is even the best of
all conceivable strategies under the given assumptions.” As far as I am aware, the
last time the conjecture was addressed was in Bruss and Yor (2012).
The present article proves the conjecture, thus closing a 36-years gap, and even
more: The e−1-strategy is the unique optimal strategy under no information.
2 The Unified Approach
We begin with a review of the Unified Approach-model and previously known results.
Unified Approach: Suppose N > 0 points are i.i.d. with a continuous
distribution function F on some interval [0, T ]. Points are marked with
qualities which are supposed to be uniquely rankable from 1 (best) to
N (worst), and all rank arrival orders are supposed to be equally likely.
The goal is to maximize the probability of stopping online and without
recall on rank 1. (B. (1984))
This model was suggested for the best choice problem (secretary problem) for an
unknown number N of candidates. Recall that, by Re´nyi’s theorem of relative ranks
(Re´nyi (1962)), the kth candidate has relative rank j with probability 1/k for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k whenever all rank arrival orders are equally likely.
Previous models for unknown N had shown that the price for not knowing N can
be high. The influential paper by Presman and Sonin (1972) which modelled the
unknown N via the hypothesis of a known distribution {P (N = n)}, displayed the
intricacies arising by the possible appearance of so-called stopping islands. More-
over, Abdel-Hamid et al. (1982) showed that the N -unknown problem may have
several solutions, and, much worse, that for any ǫ > 0 there exists a sufficiently un-
favorable distribution {P (N = n)}n=1,2,··· to reduce the optimal success probability
2
to a value smaller than ǫ. In other words, if N is modelled via {P (N = n)}, opti-
mality may mean in some cases almost nothing. This contrasts with the well-known
lower bound 1/e which holds in the classical model for known N = n ≥ 1. These
discouraging facts for unknown N instigated efforts to find more tractable models,
as e.g. the model of Stewart (1981), or the one of Cowan and Zabzcyk (1978) and
its generalization studied in Bruss (1987), and also others.
The unified approach of B. (1984) was different. The idea behind it was that it
is typically easier to estimate - and this is where the time distribution F comes in
- when options are more likely to arrive conditional on knowing that they do arrive
than making hypotheses about the distribution of its number. No assumption at all
was made about the distribution of N.
The continuous arrival time distribution F is the crucial part with respect to
applications. As one referee pointed out, the model itself was, in different terms,
already in the abstract of Rubin (1966). For our open problem the form of F is
irrelevant, however. If we transform the unordered i.i.d arrival times of the best,
the second best ... , T1, T2, ... say, by T
∗
k := F (Tk), then the T
∗
k are i.i.d. U [0, 1]
random variables and, since F is continuous and increasing, the time transformation
maintains the arrival order of the different relative ranks. Thus, if we know the
optimal strategy for dealing with i.i.d. U [0, 1] random arrivals on [0, 1], then we
know it as well for i.i.d. F -distributed arrival times on the original horizon [0, T ].
In all what follows we therefore confine our interest to uniformly distributed arrival
times in [0, 1]-time.
2.1 Related problems
A related problem, to which we will return in Subsection 2.6, is the so-called last-
arrival-problem under no information (l.a.p.) studied by Bruss and Yor (2012).
In this model an unknown number N of points are i.i.d. U [0, 1] random variables,
and an observer, inspecting the interval [0, 1] sequentially from left to right, wants to
maximise the probability of stopping on the very last point. No information about
N whatsoever is given. Only one stop is allowed, and this again without recall on
preceding observations (online). Thus the only difference of the l.a.p. model of B.
and Yor (2012) to the Unified Approach model of B. (1984) is that no ranks are
attributed to the observations (points).
Other related problems, now again with the objective to get rank 1 of uniquely
ranked candidates, arise by combining the Unified Approach model and the model
of Presman and Sonin (1972) for different types of distributions of N . If (P (N =
n))n=1,2,··· is known, then one is in the setting of a model with a prior. The i.i.d.
U [0, 1] arrival-times can then be used as an additional means of statistical inference
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to update the posterior distribution of N . Stopping islands, as observed in the paper
of Presman and Sonin (1972), bear over to corresponding islands in continuous time.
The optimal strategy may thus become very complicated, and we would typically
not like to compute it, but, in principle, it can be computed.
For the latter class of problems, what would be a good alternative? Moreover,
and in particular, what can one do if one has absolutely no information about N?
2.2 The 1/e-law
The answer given by the unified approach (B.(1984)) was that, as far as applications
are concerned, we need not care much. For ease of reference we recall these results
summarised as the 1/e-law. Here we follow the meanwhile establised tradition (see
e.g. Goldie and Rogers (1984)) to call an observation of relative rank 1 a record
value, or simply record, and the time when a record appears a record time. Re´nyi
(1962) had called a record an e´le´ment saillant.
The 1/e-law says:
1. The strategy to wait (in [0, 1]-time) up to time 1/e ≈ 0.3678, and
then to select the first record (if any from time 1/e onward), called the
1/e-strategy, succeeds for all N with probability at least 1/e.
2. There exists no strategy which would be better for all N.
3. The 1/e-strategy selects no candidate with precise probability 1/e.
Note also that 1. and 3. imply that a non-best option is selected with probability
smaller than 1 − 2/e ≈ 0.2642. This multiple role of the number 1/e gave rise to
the name 1/e-law, and Table 1 (B.(1984), p. 336) shows how good the lower bound
1/e for the success probability actually is. Taking also into account the minimax
optimality stated in 2. we can conclude that the 1/e-strategy is a convenient and
convincing alternative for all practical purposes. See e.g. the comments of Samuels
(Math. Reviews: 1985).
But then, the following question arises:
Is the 1/e-strategy optimal if we have no prior information at all on N?
This is thus the open problem of B. (1984). As mentioned before, the last written
attempt to draw attention to it seems to be the paper by B. and Yor (2012; see
subsection 6.4). These authors studied the mentioned l.a.p., that is, the problem of
stopping on the very last point. As a by-product of their method, they could give
an independent proof of the 1/e-law. This proof did not provide insight into the
open question, however.
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We have to return to what is known.
What is known?
(I) Optimal x-strategies given N = n. First, suppose that N were known,
say N = n, and that we want to determine the optimal strategy in the class of so-
called x-strategies, that is to wait until time x ∈ [0, 1] and then to select, if any, the
first record from time x onward. It is not difficult to find, conditioned on {N = n},
the optimal waiting time xn and its performance in this class of x-strategies, namely
(see B.(1984), p. 884, (2)-(7)),
x1 = 0; xn = arg
{
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 :
n−1∑
k=1
(1− x)k
k
= 1
}
, n = 2, 3, · · · . (1)
Note that the xn-strategy is suboptimal since it does not fully use the knowledge
N = n, as it is the case for the optimal strategy for the classical secretary problem
for n candidates.
(II) Monotonicity results. We can derive from (1) that
pn(x) := P (x−strategy succeeds
∣∣N = n) = (1− x)n
n
+ x
n−1∑
k=1
(1− x)k
k
, (2)
and also that pn(x) ≥ pn+1(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This implies
∀x ∈ [0, 1] : pn(x) ↓ lim
n→∞
pn(x) = −x log(x). (3)
Moreover, it follows from (2) and (3) that the optimal waiting time xn and the
corresponding optimal win probability pn(xn) satisfy, respectively,
xn ↑
1
e
and p(xn) ↓
1
e
, as n→∞. (4)
(III) Asymtotic optimality. The 1/e-strategy is, as n → ∞, asymptotically
optimal with win probability 1/e. This follows from (3) and (4), showing that the
limiting performance of the 1/e-strategy is the same as that of the well-known
optimal strategy for the classical secretary problem for known n as n→∞, namely
1/e. Clearly one cannot do better than in the case that one knows N.
2.3 Interest versus challenge
Apart from the challenge of getting a complete answer, the question of optimality
of the 1/e-strategy in the case of no information is, in the light of the 1/e-law, of
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little interest in practice. The reason is that, in real world problems, we typically
have an idea about bounds for N, and then we can look up the mentioned Table 1
of B. (1984) to assess the likely range of the win probability.
Moreover, if we have an idea about an upper bound of N , then this opens already
the way to more standard arguments. For instance, if we see no point yet up to time
t = 0.33, say, we expect N around 3, say, that is to be rather small. Although
we cannot use Bayes’ formula to obtain without a prior a corresponding posterior
distribution of N , we would find it improbable that N would be large. But since,
given N = n, the optimal waiting time xn satisfies xn < 1/e for all n (see (4)),
the 1/e-strategy cannot be optimal if we see any upper bound nu for N. Even the
simple xnu-strategy to wait until xnu and then to accept the first record (if any) is,
according to (3), already better.
Challenge and Intuition
The mathematical challenge to have a complete answer for the case of no-
information remains however, in particular because the unified approach model was
created in order to deal with any N. But then, what attempts were made before,
and why?
Looking in (II) of Subsection 2.2 closely at (2), (3) and (4), the open problem
comes up quite naturally. Things become intriguing. For any N = n there is a
better strategy since the optimal xn-waiting time strategy turns out strictly better
than the 1/e-strategy. Thus one gets the feeling that if there were a way of collecting
information about N sufficiently quickly, whatever this may mean, then this may
be sufficient to prove that the 1/e-strategy cannot be optimal. Viewing to disprove
optimality, it seems promising to assume certain types and amounts of weak infor-
mation about N , still strong enough to imply that the 1/e-strategy is not optimal,
and then to weaken the information.
Interestingly, as soon as one lets information aboutN become weaker and weaker,
and finally fade away towards no-information, the 1/e-waiting time seems to become
a miraculous ”fixpoint” of optimal thresholds. According to III, this would surprise
us much less if no-information on N implied in any way that N is likely to be large,
but of course it does not! What remained was the tantalizing question whether
the attempts to disprove optimality in a constructive way by collecting information
sufficiently quickly was possibly not clever enough.
What about trying to find other types of counterexamples?
The challenge remains. It is not easy to do this without leaving the framework
of no-information. Arguing for example “If we have no information on {P (N =
n)}n=1,2,···, then let us for instance suppose that this distribution turns out such and
such, and that we have seen a history of points such and such, ...” and then imply
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that the 1/e-strategy is not optimal, would not be correct. Proofs by contradiction
are only valid within the same logical framework, i.e. no-information. Arguments
implying initial information whatsoever on N would not be rigorous. For the same
reason, simulations are meaningless as they require parameters to randomize N, and
thus information on N must be inputted. Looking for counterexamples cannot be
expected to help. Knowing this increases the challenge.
2.4 Ill-posed or well-posed problem?
Is the question possibly ill-posed?
This question was asked repeatedly by several peers, and, during certain periods,
the author also shared these doubts. Indeed, the notion of “no-information” requires
clarification.
Can one interpret no-information in the sense that all possible values of N are in
an unknown interval {1, 2, · · · , n} with no value of N being more likely than others,
and then let n tend to infinity?
No. This is equivalent to the improper Laplace prior for N . It is true that this
prior is the prime candidate for no-information, and very often used to express the
lack of knowledge about a parameter. However, this prior implies that N is likely to
be very large, and this is information. Therefore, when Bruss (1988) pp. 312-314,
used this prior to prove that the 1/e-strategy is optimal “in a Bayesian sense,” he
sees his statement today as not being sufficiently precise. His answer was only a
partial answer. After all, “no information” on N should mean that at time 0 we
know really nothing at all about N.
Now, more importantly, can we assure that the no-information hypothesis is a
honest hypothesis in the sense that it is contradiction-free? If it is not contradiction-
free, then of course we must declare the open problem ill-posed.
2.5 Formalising no-information
When B. and Yor (2012) studied the last-arrival problem (l.a.p.) under the no-
information hypothesis, they faced a similar difficulty of knowing whether their
problem is well-posed. These authors found a simple argument to prove that it is
impossible to prove that the no-information hypothesis may imply contradictions!
Their argument was that there is only one contradiction-free way to define no-
information, namely indirectly by saying where no-information must ”live” and how
it must compare to its surrounding in the space where it lives. B. and Yor (2012)
concluded that, whatever a hypothetical information space H may look like for the
unknown parameter or random variable N , no-information is bound to be a singleton
in that space H.
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This definition may first sound like a formalism to prevent saying something
wrong, but there is more to it. It implies that, as a singleton, the no-information
hypothesis cannot lead to contradictory implications. A singleton in H has, by
definition of a singleton, nothing in common with other points in H, whereas con-
tradicting implications cannot come out of nothing. They would need different
sources of information giving rise to (at least two) different implications.
B. and Yor (2012) therefore concluded that they should, a priori, take a construc-
tive attitude and try to find a solution. And so they did. But then the question was
to know whether their solution is the solution of a well-posed problem. Hadamard’s
criteria (Hadamard (1902)) were the only criteria B. and Yor could find for the solu-
tion of a well-posed problem, and they agreed with these criteria. This is why they
were glad to see that their solution fully satisfied Hadamard’s criteria. According to
these criteria, the solution given in B. and Yor (2012, subsection 5.3) is the solution
of a well-posed problem.
Despite similarities between the l.a.p. and our open problem, the situation in
the latter will turn out quite differently, however. We will see that the open prob-
lem turns out a well-posed self-contained problem, and that this fact is mainly a
consequence of Re´nyi’s Theorem of relative ranks. We will solve the open problem,
and, as we shall see, no external criteria will be needed.
One part of the approach of B. and Y. (2012), following next, remains however
very helpful for our problem.
2.6 Proportional increments
For N i.i.d. U([0, 1]) arrival points, let
Nt = # arrivals up to time t, t ∈ [0, 1].
B. and Yor (2012, subsection 1.1 and pp. 3242-46) showed that the counting process
(Nt)0≤t≤1 of incoming points on [0, 1] with N := N1 can be seen as a history-driven
process with, what they called, proportional increments. This means that the process
(Nt) must satisfy
∀ 0 < t < 1 with Nt > 0 :
E(Nt+∆t −Nt|Ft) =
∆t
t
Nt a.s., 0 < ∆t ≤ 1− t,
where the condition Nt > 0 is crucial. Such a process (Nt) will be said to have the
property of proportional increments, in short p.i.-property.
Conditioned on N = N1 > 0, let T1 be the first arrival time. The definition of
the p.i.-property implies then that, given N > 0, the process (Nt/t) is a martingale
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on [T1, 1], as shown in B. and Yor (2012, p. 3245). This clearly holds also under the
stronger assumption that (Nt) is a Poisson process on [0, 1]. However, B. and Yor
(2012, see p. 3255) saw a true benefit in not imposing that (Nu) be Poisson.
To be complete on this, we should mention that in our open problem we could,
from a purely decision-theoretic point of view, suppose right away that the process
(Nt)0≤t≤1 is a Poisson point process with unknown rate. Indeed, this cannot make
a difference for decisions because we cannot tell a counting process which leaves a
pattern of arrival times of a homogeneous Poisson process from another counting
process leaving, in distribution, the same pattern. Doing so would have the advan-
tage to be able to use the same compensator on the whole interval [0, 1]. However,
we will not need the Poisson process assumption.
2.7 Towards suitable odds-theroems
Recall that our open problem is different from the l.a.p. of B. and Yor (2012) since
in the Unified Approach model we would like to stop on the very last record, not on
the very last point, and thus our approach must also be different.
The very first arrival time T1 in the counting process (Nt), is the time when (Nt)
makes its first jump, and the processes (Nt) and (Nt/t) have exactly the same jump
times. T1 is also the birth time of the record process (Rt), say, defined by
Rt = # records on [0, t], 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
Since in our open problem any strategy is equivalent for N = 0 we may and do
suppose that N > 0 almost surely, and thus T1 < 1 almost surely. N is unknown at
time 0, but at time 1 we know that, by definition, N = N1 ≥ 1 almost surely.
Since the first arrival is also the first record, we have NT1− = RT1− = 0 and
NT1 = RT1 = 1. Thus the two processes (Nt) and (Rt) have the same random birth
time T1. On the interval [T1, 1], the process (Nt) has proportional increments, i.e.
dependent increments, whereas (Rt) has, as we shall see later, independent non-
homogeneous increments.
To prepare for these properties of (Rt), the idea is to first concentrate on its
increments (after time T1). For this purpose we prove two suitably extended versions
the Odds-Theorem of optimal stopping. We should also mention here that Ferguson
(2016) gave several interesting extensions of the Odds-theorem in other directions.
Moreover, Matsui and Ano (2016) studied in another extension lower bounds of the
optimal success probability for the case of multiple stops. However, here we will
here new extensions which are specifically tailored for our open problem.
We begin with an extension in discrete time.
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2.8 Odds-Theorems for delayed stopping
Let n be a positive integer, and let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be independent Bernoulli random
variables with success parameters pk = P (Xk = 1) = 1−P (Xk = 0), k = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Suppose our goal is to maximize the probability of stopping online on the last success,
i.e. on the last Xk = 1. The optimal strategy to achieve this goal is immediate from
the Odds-Theorem (Bruss (2000)) which we recall for convenience of reference. Let
qk = 1− pk; rk =
pk
qk
; R(k, n) =
n∑
j=k
rj , k = 1, 2, · · · , n, (5)
and let the integer s ≥ 1 (called threshold index) be defined by
s =
{
1 , if R(1, n) < 1
sup{1 ≤ k ≤ n : R(k, n) ≥ 1} , otherwise.
(6)
The strategy to stop on the first index k with k ≥ s and Xk = 1 (if such a k exists)
maximises the probability of stopping on the very last success (B.2000). If no such
k exists, then it is understood that we have to stop at time n and lose by definition.
Delayed stopping in discrete time
Let us now consider the new case that there is a deterministic or a random delay
imposed by a random variable W with values in {1, 2, · · · , n} in the sense that
stopping is not allowed before time W . Our objective, as before, is to maximize
the probability of stopping on the last succes. Does it suffice to replace simply the
threshold s defined in (6) by s˜ := max{W, s} to obtain an optimal strategy? This
seems trivial (and is true) if W is deterministic.
In general this is not true, of course, even not true if W is a stopping time on
X1, X2, · · · , Xn, unless we can guarantee that the knowledge of W has no effect
on the laws of XW+1, XW+2, . . . and their independence. The following is a more
tractable formulation.
Theorem 2.1. Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be Bernoulli random variables defined on a fil-
tered probability space (Ω,A, (Ak), P ) where Ak = σ({Xj : 1 ≤ j ≤ k}). Suppose
there exists a random time W for X1, X2, · · · , Xn on the same probability space such
that the Xj with j ≥W are independent random variables satisfying
pj(w) := P (Xj = 1|W ≤ w), 1 ≤ w ≤ j ≤ n.
Then, putting rj(w) = pj(w)/(1− pj(w)), it is optimal to stop at the random time
τ := inf
{
k ∈ {W,W + 1, · · · , n} : {Xk = 1} &
n∑
j=k+1
rj(W ) ≤ 1
}
, (7)
with the understanding that we stop at time n and lose by definition, if {...} = ∅.
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Remark 2.2. We note that no (initial) independence hypothesis is assumed for the
X1, X2, · · · but only for those Xj’s with j ≥ W.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 Our proof will profit from the proof of the Odds-Theorem
(B. (2000)) if we rewrite the threshold index (6) in an equivalent form.
Recall the definition of R(k, n) in (5). If we define, as usual, an empty sum as zero,
then s defined in (6) can be written as
s′ = inf
{
1 ≤ k ≤ n : R(k + 1, n) :=
n∑
j=k+1
rj ≤ 1
}
. (8)
This is straightforward: If R(1, n) ≤ 1 then R(2, n) ≤ 1 so that from (8) s′ = 1,
and s = 1, as stated in (6). Otherwise, if R(1, n) > 1, then there exists a unique k
where R(k + 1, n) drops for the first time below the value 1 since R(k, n) decreases
in k, and R(n + 1, n) = 0. The first such k is the s′ defined in (8). The definitions
(6) and (8) are thus equivalent. (See also Stirzaker (2015, p. 50))
Let now pj(w) as defined in Theorem 2.1, and let for j = w,w + 1, · · · , n
qj(w) = 1− pj(w) = P (Xj = 0|W ≤ w).
It follows from the assumptions concerning W that Xw, Xw+1, · · · , Xn are indepen-
dent random variables with laws only dependent on the event {W ≤ w}. If we think
of w as being fixed, then we can and do define pj := pj(w) for all w ≤ j ≤ n
and use the same notation as before defined in (5) with the corresponding odds
rj(w) = pj(w)/qj(w) =: rj. Accordingly, we have for k ≥ w the same simple mono-
tonicity property R(k, n) ≥ R(k + 1, n).
It is easy to check that this monotonicity property is equivalent to the uni-
modality property proved in B. (2000, p.1386, lines 3-12). The latter implies that
the optimal rule is a monotone rule in the sense that, once it is optimal to stop on
a success at index k, then it is also optimal to stop on a success after index k. (See
e.g. section 5 of Chow et al. (1971). For a convenient criterion for a stopping rule
in the discrete setting being monotone, see Ferguson (2016, p. 49)).
Note that, whatever W = w ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, the odds rj := rj(w) are determin-
istic functions of the pj := pj(w), and so the future odds (rj)j≥W+1 are also known
and will not change. The only restriction we have to keep in mind for the simplified
notation is that k ≥ w on the set {W ≤ w}. But then the monotonicity property of
R(·, ·) is also not affected, that is
∀ℓ ≥ j : R(W + j, n) ≤ 1 =⇒ R(W + ℓ, n) ≤ 1.
11
Since the latter implies the uni-modality property of the resulting win probability
on W ≤ j ≤ n, the monotone rule property is again maintained for the optimal rule
after the random time W, exactly as in B. (2000). Therefore the optimal strategy is
to stop on the first success (if it exists) from time τ onwards where τ satisfies
τ ≥W and
n∑
j=τ+1
rj(W ) ≤ 1. (9)
This is the threshold index τ of Theorem 2.1, and hence the proof.
Remark 2.3. Note that Theorem 2.1 is intuitive. Its applicability, nevertheless, can
be delicate. It depends on the pj’s being predictable for all j ≥W. Often this is not
the case. For instance, we may have (conditionally) independent random variables,
but, if we collect information about the pj from observations then the distributions
of the future values of Xj+1, Xj+2, · · · typically depend on Xk, 1 ≤ k ≤ j, on which,
for a stopping time W, the event {W = j} is allowed to depend! (For our purpose of
settling the open question the Theorem will turn out to be the perfect tool, however.)
Remark 2.4. (Side-remark). Given that (8) is a one-line definition whereas (6)
needs two lines, some readers ask why B. (2000) used definition (6). The answer
is that it is (6) which points to the odds-algorithm (subsection 2.1, p.1386) which
works backwards until the stopping time s with rn, rn−1, · · · to give optimal strategy
and value at the same time. No other algorithm can be quicker since it computes
exactly those rj which produce both answers. If we used instead the odds beginning
with r1, r2, · · · and (8) we would first need R(1, n), implying in general redundant
calculations. For the preceding theorem, however, we clearly needed (8).
Delayed stopping in continuous time
We now state and prove a continuous-time analogue of the Theorem 2.1 which plays
an important role in the proof of the open conjecture. We state and prove it in a
slightly more general form than what we need for the conjecture, because it may be
also of interest for other problems of optimal stopping.
Theorem 2.5. Suppose (Ct) is a counting process on [0, 1] for which there exists a
random time T such that the confined process (Ct)T <t≤1 has independent increments
according to a predictable (non-random) intensity measure η(t)T <t≤1. We suppose
that η(t) is Riemann integrable on [0, 1] with E(C1) <∞. Then the optimal strategy
to stop on the last jump-time of (Ct) is to select, if it exists, the first arrival time
τ ≥ T with τ satisfying
E(C1 − Cτ ) =
ˆ 1
τ
η(u) ≤ 1. (10)
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Remark 2.6. In the special case when the process (Ct) is a Poisson process on
[0, 1] the conditions of Theorem 2.6 are clearly satisfied everywhere on [0, 1]. See
also subsection 4.1 of B. (2000).
Proof of Theorem 2.6
Consider a partition {u0 < u1 < · · · < um}, m ∈ {1, 2, · · · }, of the random sub-
interval [T , 1] ⊆ [0, 1] with u0 = T and um = 1. Let the index j be thought of as
depending on m, thus j := j(m) and uj := uj(m). Put
pj := pj(m) =
ˆ uj
uj−1
η(u)du, j = 1, 2, · · · , m, (11)
where [uj−1, uj[ is by definition the jth sub-interval of the partition, j = 1, 2, · · · , m.
It follows that pj is the expected number of points of the process (Cu) in the jth
sub-interval, and thus by additivity from (11)
m∑
j=1
pj =
ˆ 1
T
η(u)du = E(C1 − CT ) ≤ E(C1) <∞. (12)
Since all pj in (11) are non-negative, and E(C1) is finite, we can interpret them all
as probabilities of certain events as soon as we choose sufficiently fine partitions to
have the the pj less or equal to 1. This is always possible since, as we see in (11),
pj → 0 as ∆j = uj−uj−1 → 0. For the following it is understood that we only speak
of such sufficiently fine partitions. Since the counting process (Cu) has independent
increments, this allows us at the same time to see the pj as the success probabilities
of independent Bernoulli random variables, namely as the indicators
Ij := Ij(m) = 1
{
[uj−1, uj[ contains jump times of (Cu)T ≤u≤1
}
for j = 1, 2, · · · , m. The success probability of the jth Bernoulli experiment is then
given by pj = E(Ij). Let us call this interpretation the ”Bernoulli model” for incre-
ments of the process (Cu) for the chosen partition of [T , 1].
To be definite we now confine our interest to equidistant partitions, and in this
class to those such that all pj < 1. Let
s(m) = sup
j∈{1,2,··· ,m}
{pj(m)}.
From (11) we obtain pj ∼ ∆jη(uj) and thus, as ∆j → 0, we have E(Ij) → 0 and
also
E(Ij(m))
/
P ( [uj, uj+1[ contains exactly one jump time)→ 1. (13)
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The idea is now the following: First, if we can interpret any increment Cuk −
Cuj , j ≤ k ≤ m as a sum of odds in our Bernoulli models, then the optimal odds-
rule for stopping on the last success identifies the optimal rule for stopping on the
last sub-interval of the partition containing jump-times. Note that for any fixed m,
the last Bernoulli success may correspond to more than one point in the last sub-
interval containing points (i.e. jump-times of (Cu)). Second, in a limiting Bernoulli
model defined by letting m → ∞, the last success corresponds, according to (13),
with probability 1 to the very last jump in (Cu). Hence, provided that the notion
of limiting odds is meaningful for the limiting Bernoulli model, the optimal rule in
the latter identifies the optimal rule for stopping on the last jump of (Cu).
We will combine both parts by showing that the continuous-time analogue of
odds in the limiting Bernoulli model is an intensity measure of a counting process,
and we will adapt it to become the process (Cu).
Let ρ be a real-valued non-negative Riemann integrable function ρ : [0, 1]→ R+,
and let
Ψ(x,∆x) :=
ˆ x+∆x
x
ρ(u)du.
We now chose a function ρ in such a way that all Ψ(uj,∆j) satisfy the equation
Ψj := Ψ(uj,∆j) =
pj
1− pj
= rj , j = 1, 2, . . . , m. (14)
Note that the existence of such a function ρ is evident for any finite partition since
the class of Riemann integrable functions contains already infinitely many. If we
choose ρ in this class we have lim∆u→0Ψ(u,∆u)/∆u exists almost everywhere on
[T , 1], and this derivative coincides with ρ(u) on [T , 1].
Now we must check whether such a fnction ρ exists if we let the caliber of the
partition tend to 0.We shall now prove that the ρ is unique in the limiting Bernoulli
model, and that η and ρ coincide almost everywhere on [T , 1]. It will thus be justified
to call the function ρ the odds-intensity associated with the (identical) intensity η
of the process (Cu) on [T , 1].
Indeed, recalling ∆j = 1/m, we will first show that
(i) ρ(uj) = lim
∆j→0
1
∆j
rj = η(uj), j = 1, 2, · · ·
(ii) lim
m→∞
m∑
j=1
Ψ(uj,∆j) =
∞∑
j=1
lim
m→∞
Ψ(uj,∆j).
The limiting equation (i) follows from the definition of odds in the Bernoulli models,
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and from (11), since
pj
1− pj
1
∆j
∼
1
∆j
∆jη(uj)
(1−∆jη(uj))
=
η(uj)
1−∆jη(uj)
→ η(uj) as ∆j → 0.
To see (ii), we first recall that for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m we have pj < 1 and thus from
(14)
pj ≤ Ψj = pj/(1− pj).
For fixed ǫ with 0 < ǫ < 1 we now choose an integer m := m(ǫ) large enough so
that s(m) := sup{pk : 1 ≤ k ≤ m} < ǫ. This is trivially always possible for a
finite number m of pk, since, again seen as a function of ∆k, in (11) each pk → 0 as
∆k → 0+, that is as m→∞. Then we obtain
pj ≤ Ψj ≤ pj/(1− s(m)) ≤ pj/(1− ǫ),
or with (11) more explicitly,
ˆ uj
uj−1
η(u) du ≤ Ψj ≤
1
1− ǫ
ˆ uj
uj−1
η(u) du. (15)
Since this inequality holds for all j = 1, 2, · · · , m(ǫ), it must hold also for any
sum of these terms (column-wise) taken over the same set of indices. In particular
this includes tail sums beginning at an arbitrary time x ≥ T . Hence, by bounded
convergence, (ii) is true.
But then the latter also holds for any random time x := τ ≥ T , since, by the
hypothesis stated in Theorem 2.5, the intensity measure η is supposed to be non-
random from time T onwards. Thus for any set of sub-intervals of [T , 1], the limiting
odds sum for the limiting Bernoulli model, corresponds to the integral of ρ over the
same set of intervals. Therefore, in particular, ρ satisfying (14) must satisfy for any
ǫ and equidistant partition with caliber ∆j = 1/m(ǫ)
E
(
C1 − Cτ
)
=
ˆ 1
τ
η(u)du ≤
ˆ 1
τ
ρ(u)du ≤
1
1− ǫ
E
(
C1 − Cτ
)
. (16)
Since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily close to 0 in the inequality (16) it follows from
the squeezing theorem that the inner integral is bound to coincide with E(C1−Cτ).
According to (ii), this inner integral is however the limiting tail sum of odds for the
limiting Bernoulli model, and (i) implies thus ρ(u) = η(u).
Finally, letting ǫ → 0+ in (16) that the inner integral, that is, the limiting tail
sum of odds in the limiting Bernoulli model, drops below 1 if and only if E(C1−Cτ )
does so. Hence the proof.
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Remark 2.7. The preceding criterion is valid independently of whether τ is a jump-
time of (Cu) or not. Indeed, if η(u) > 0 on [τ, 1] then for all 0 < ǫ < 1 − τ we have
E(C1 −Cτ+ǫ) < 1. Therefore, if τ happens to be a jump-time of (Cu) t≤u≤1 we must
also stop on τ .
We are now ready to tackle our main problem.
3 Optimality of the 1/e-strategy
3.1 Preview and visualisation of our approach
If the optimal strategy exists, then it must solely be based on all the sequential
information we can have, that is, on the information stemming from the history of
arrivals (points) and their relative ranks.
Clearly, any strategy is trivially optimal if there are no points so that we can
confine our interest to the case N > 0. Denote by Nu the number of arrivals up to
time u. If N > 0, there is at least one arrival on [0, 1], and the first one is a record
by definition.
Due to the i.i.d. structure of points on [0, 1], if the decision maker looks back at
time t ∈ [0, 1], and if there are preceding arrivals, then he or she knows that their
pattern is the outcome of i.i.d. uniformly distributed points on [0, t]. The same will
hold by looking forward, that is, if there are arrivals then their unordered arrival
times are i.i.d. on [t, 1]. This is true since i.i.d. uniform random variables on a given
interval I, say, stay i.i.d. conditioned on their location in sub-intervals of I. This
is illustrated in the figure below (Fig.1) where arrivals are denoted by *, and where
the first * is meant to indicate the arrival time T1.
|0............................ ∗ ........... ∗ ... ∗ ..←− |t ............................. |1
|0............................ ∗ ........... ∗ ... ∗ ..... ...|t −→ ...................... |1
Fig. 1
Decision-maker’s perception
From the first arrival time T1 onwards (0 < T1 < 1 a.s.) the decision maker has
the information that the counting process (Nu)u≥T1 is a process with proportional
increments as defined in Subsection 2.6. See Fig. 2. Accordingly, given Nu, the
expected value of the number of points in [u, u + ∆u[ equals (Nu∆u)/u almost
surely, and it is important to note that no o(∆u) is added here.
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|0........................... T1 ........... ∗ ... ∗ ..(Nu)u≥T1 ......?........?...........|1
Fig. 2
(Nu)u≥T1 is a proportional-increments process
The relevant stochastic process for stopping on rank 1 is then the record process
(Ru)u≥T1 which is a sub-process of (Nu)u≥T1(see Fig. 3)
|0........................... ∗ ........... ? ... ? (Ru)u≥T1.......?..........?............|1
Fig. 3
(Ru)u≥T1 is obtained from (Nu)u≥T1 by inverse-proportional thinning.
This thinning is by Re´nyi’s Theorem such that if J ≥ T1 is a jump-time of the
process (Nu) then it is retained for the record process (Ru)u≥T1 with probability 1/NJ
independently of retained preceding points. By this inverse-proportional thinning of
(Nu)u≥T1 , the increments of the resulting sub-process (Ru)u≥T1 become independent
with a known distribution depending only on time.
With independent increments having a predictable non-random intensity mea-
sure, the process (Ru) can now play the role of (Cu) in Theorem 2.5. Stopping online
on the desired rank 1 means stopping online on the very last record, i.e. on the last
jump of (Ru)u≥T1, and this will lead to the desired result.
We are now ready for the main result and its proof. We prove the conjecture in
an even stronger form, namely the 1/e-strategy is the unique optimal strategy for
the best-choice problem under no information.
Theorem 3.1. The 1/e-strategy is the unique optimal strategy for the best-choice
problem under no information on the number N of options.
Proof Recall the unified approach model in Section 2.1. After time transformation
via the continuous distribution function F , time runs from 0 to 1. As before we
denote the process counting the arrivals on [0, 1] by (Nu)0≤u≤1, and its sequential
arrival times by T1, T2, · · · . The sub-process counting the corresponding records is
denoted by (Ru)0≤u≤1. The last jump time of (Ru) will thus be the location of the
last record, i.e., of absolute rank 1 (the best).
Therefore our Theorem requires to prove that, under the no-information hypoth-
esis on N, it is optimal to stop on the very first record time greater or equal time
1/e provided that it exists (otherwise we have to stop at time 1 and loose), and that
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this is the unique optimal stopping time. Since we know already from the 1/e-law
that the 1/e-strategy is uniquely optimal for N = N1 = ∞ (see (III) in Subsection
2.2) we can confine our interest to 1 ≤ N1 <∞ without, however, knowing an upper
bound for N1.
Our proof will use Theorem 2.5 by showing that the record process (Ru) satisfies
the hypotheses of the process (Cu) with T := T1, which is the first arrival time in
both processes (Nu)0≤u≤1 and (Ru)0≤u≤1. Since R1 ≤ N1 we have E(R1) <∞.
Let Ft denote the filtration generated by {Ns : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and denote by Gt the
one generated by both {Ns : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and {Rs : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} together. Since both
fields are clearly increasing we have Gt ⊆ Gu for t ≤ u ≤ 1.
We will now show is that T1 is a Gt-measurable stopping time T from which
onward (Rt) has independent increments. Clearly T1 is a (Gt)-measurable stopping
time since (Ft ⊆ Gt). Given T1, choose t ∈ [T1, 1] and define for fixed m ∈ {2, 3, · · · }
and k = 0, 1, 2, · · ·m− 1,
uk := uk(t) = t +
k(1− t)
m
,
∆k := ∆k(t) = uk+1 − uk =
1− t
m
.
It follows that for any Gu-measurable random variable X and 0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ 1,
E(E(X
∣∣Gu) | Gt) = E(X∣∣Gt). (17)
Let now X denote the number of records in [t, 1], that is X = R1 − Rt. From the
linearity of the expectation operator we obtain
E
(
R1 − Rt
∣∣Gt) = E
(
m−1∑
k=0
(Ruk+1 − Ruk)
∣∣∣Gt
)
=
m−1∑
k=0
E
(
Ruk+1 −Ruk
∣∣∣Gt) , (18)
and then from (18) used in (17)
E
(
R1 − Rt
∣∣∣Gt) = m−1∑
k=0
E
(
E
(
Ruk+1 − Ruk
∣∣∣Guk) ∣∣∣Gt) . (19)
Let λ(u) denote the rate of the point process (Nt) at time u, and h(u) be the
conditional probability of a point appearing at time u being a record. The process
(Nu) inherits history-dependence from the p.i.-property so that λ(u) is also history-
dependent, namely a F -predictable intensity process for (Nt) relative to the filtration
(Ft). The function h(u) acts like a thinning on the counting process (Nt), retaining
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only its record-times as events. The resulting record process has an intensity, η say,
which may depend on both λ and h, and which we write formally as
η(u) := gλ,h(u) , T1 ≤ u ≤ 1. (20)
Note that this formal definition is a step of caution because h(u) and λ(u) are
history-dependent random variables, and dependent on each other. Thus we do
not assume so far that η(u) = gλ,h(u) factorises into λ(u)h(u) over sub-intervals we
will consider. Of course we know it does so point-wise because h is defined as the
conditional probability of a point being retained as a record.
Now consider the inner conditional expectation on the r.h.s. of (19). Since
(Nu)T1≤u≤1 is a p.i.-process, and Nuk is Guk -measurable, we have correspondingly
E(Nuk+1 −Nuk
∣∣∣Guk) = ∆kNuk/uk a.s.,
and thus λ(uk) = Nuk/uk a.s.. Moreover, if uk were a jump-time for (Nu) it would
be according to Re´nyi’s Theorem a record time with probabilty 1/Nuk which shows
that h in (20) is also history-dependent.
We now show the central fact that the increments of the record process (Ru) on
[u, u+∆u[ given Gu will never depend on the locations of jump-times in [u, u+∆u[,
but only on the number of jumps in there. Indeed, if we denote the jth jump-time
in [uk, uk+1[ by Aj := Tj+Nuk , then
E
(
Ruk+1 −Ruk
∣∣∣Nuk+1 −Nuk = J ; A1, A2, · · · , AJ)
= E
(
J∑
j=1
1{Aj is a record time}
)
.
Since J ≤ N1 <∞ we can exchange the operators expectation and summation, and
then use Re´nyi’s Theorem. Therefore, by the definition of the Aj , the latter equals
J∑
j=1
P
(
Aj is a record time
∣∣∣Guk) =
J∑
j=1
1
Nuk + j
a.s., (21)
which is understood as being zero if J = 0. Given Guk , the value Nuk is a constant,
and J is Fuk-predictable. Hence the r.h.s. of (20) is Fuk-predictable and does not
depend on the location of jumps.
But then, given any interval [u, u+du], we can imagine these jump times (if any)
to be located where we want them to be within this interval, and we are entitled to
think of the first one (if any) as being in u. This implies from (21) that gλ,h in (20)
must factorize on the sub-interval [u, u+du] into the intensity of (Nu), namely λ(u),
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and the inverse proportional thinning h(u) = 1/Nu. Now recall that the p.i.-property
of (Nu) for u ≥ T1 implies
λ(u)du := E(dNu|Fu) = E(Nu+du −Nu | Fu) =
Nu
u
du a.s.. (22)
Since the inverse-proportional thinning on (Nu) is (Fu)-predictable and Fu ⊆ Gu we
have correspondingly
E
(
dRu
∣∣∣Gu) := E(Ru+du − Ru∣∣∣Gu) = Nu
u
1
Nu
du =
du
u
a.s, (23)
which depends on Gu only through the time u. This means that the stopping time T1
fulfills in Theorem 2.5 the conditions that (Cu) := (Ru) has, for u ≥ T1, independent
increments with the predictable non-random intensity measure η(u) := gλ,h(u) =
1/u.
Since Theorem 2.5 is the continuous-time version of Theorem 2.1 which implies
the monotone-rule property of the optimal rule, we know that the optimal rule must
be a monotone rule. This means we are ready to accept any record after some fixed,
or random, threshold time. The expected increment (23) tells us now that this
optimal threshold time t cannot be random if T1 ≤ t because the relevant decision
function E(R1 − Ru|Gu) at time u ≥ T1 does not depend on the history Gu. This is
all what counts because, before time T1, no decision must be taken. Therefore the
optimal threshold time must be either T1 itself, or else a fixed threshold time t ≥ T1.
Thus, from Theorem 2.5, if
E(R1 − RT1) =
ˆ 1
T1
1
u
du = − log (T1) ≤ 1, (24)
then optimal behaviour forces us to stop on the very first arrival, i.e. at time T1 itself.
If not, then, again from Theorem 2.5, optimal behaviour imposes to accept the first
available record from that time t onwards which satisfies E(R1 − Rt) = − log t ≤ 1.
Since log(t) = 1 if and only if t = 1/e and − log t decreases strictly from 1 down
to 0 on [1/e, 1] it is thus optimal to stop on the first record (if any) from time
τ = max{T1, 1/e} onwards.
We summarize: Under the no-information hypothesis we have by definition no
knowledge about N and thus none about the distribution of T1 either. However,
on the one hand, we need not care about T1 if T1 < 1/e because we would not
accept, knowing from Theorem 2.5 and (24) that it is then optimal to wait for the
first record (if any) from time 1/e onwards. On the other hand we know that it is
optimal to stop at time T1 and accept, if T1 ≥ 1/e. In simpler words this means that
it is always optimal to accept the first record (if any) from the fixed threshold time
1/e onwards. Moreover, we see from (24) that this optimal threshold is unique.
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In conclusion, the optimal strategy is unique and is, what we called in B.(2000),
and recalled in Subsection 2.2, the x-strategy for x = 1/e. This completes the
proof.
3.1.1 Why now, and why not earlier?
I think it was immature intuition which had led me, again and again, into wrong
directions. If one can solve an optimal stopping problem if a certain parameter is
known in distribution, then, having no information on this parameter, it seems so
persuading that one must learn as quickly as possible about this parameter before
it is ”too late” for stopping. The results (1), (2), (3) and (4) look strong and
made me believe them strong enough to conclude, collecting information on N ,
that the conjecture must be false or true. When I did not succeed, I believed that
my ”constructions” were not sufficiently sophisticated but that improvements should
yield what I wanted. However, they did not, and with the omnipresent problem that
counterexamples based on any type of prior information onN was inadmissible, ideas
to try out became rare. Not knowing for sure whether the problem is well-posed
made it worse.
It took time, and relevant questions from good referees, to ask oneself: Would
it not be better to forget learning and concentrate on optimality, i.e. to find an
optimality criterion for the 1/e-strategy which can be shown to be either satisfied
or non-satisfiable? And then, would it not be better to look at what comes out of
the criterion in spe and worry later about the problem being well-posed?
The last set of questions was the right one. Two modifications of the Odds-
theorem (of which, ironically, I did not think before) showed what was needed.
The independent increments of the record process generated by the decision process
made then their application relatively easy. Re´nyi’s Theorem gave these from the
stopping time T1 onward, and the intensity measure of the record process at time
u ≥ T1 turned out η(u) = 1/u. Hence the question ’well-posed or not’ did not even
come up. No external confirmation such as Hadamard’s criteria was needed. The
new Odds-Theorems showed that the 1/e-strategy is the unique optimal strategy
under no information.
3.2 k-record processes
Re´nyi’s Theorem of relative ranks (1962), which is easy to prove, was central in our
paper. For our purpose viewing the open question of optimality it was sufficient to
look at the sub-process of records which we denoted (in continuous time) by (Ru).
If instead we consider the sub-process of those points which are the kth best
so far, called k-records, then we obtain a corresponding k-record process (R
(k)
u ).
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Clearly, at the time of its appearance, a point cannot have different relative ranks
at the same time. Hence, for fixed k ≥ 1, the process (R
(k)
u ) is well-defined and
unique. We should mention here a result of Goldie and Rogers (1984) which may
be seen as the strongest in the domain of record processes. Goldie and Rogers have
shown that k-record processes are i.i.d. These authors speak here of the processes
as such including the variables (marks) attached to the points which give rise to the
relative ranks. These processes are i.i.d., and this result is stronger, less intuitive,
and harder to prove.
Knowing this and returning to the 1/e-law and our result, does there exist for a
fixed k > 1 a ”1/e-law” for getting (under no information in the Unified Approach
model) the kth best observation? Our proof of the optimality of the 1/e-strategy,
and the results above mentioned for k-record processes may suggest this, but we see
easily that this is not true. For k = 1 the last 1-record (= record) is always the best,
and vice versa, but the kth best for k > 1 can show up as a record, or 2-record, ...,
or k-record. Only trying to get the last k-record should be a strictly sub-optimal
strategy; and it is.
The optimal strategy to obtain the last k-record under no information is the
same, however, if we suppose N ≥ k (the problem is not defined otherwise). For the
proof we simply use the kth arrival time Tk of the process (Nt) as the right stopping
time to activate (R
(k)
u )u≥Tk and put Cu := R
(k)
u in Theorem 2.5.
3.3 Return to the last-arrival problem
The solution of the last arrival problem (see Theorem 5.1 of Bruss and Yor (2012))
becomes more elegant in view of Theorem 2.5.
Proof Since (Nt/t) is a Ft- martingale from the arrival time T1 onward, we have
E
(
Nu
u
∣∣∣Ft
)
=
Nt
t
a.s., T1 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ 1.
By definition of the l.a.p., any arrival point is of equal interest, so that the relevant
decision process is (Nt)T1≤t≤1 itself. Using the tower property of conditional expec-
tation and Ft ⊆ Fu we see that, from time t ≥ T1 onwards, the expected increments
E(dNu|Ft) equal (Nt/t)du and depend on Fu for u ≥ t only through Ft. By the
martingale property of (Nu/u) on [T1, 1] this remains true if we replace t by any
stopping time τ ≥ T1, i.e. E(Nuu
−1|Fτ) = Nττ
−1 a.s.. If an optimal stopping time
τ ∗ exists, then clearly τ ∗ ≥ T1. Hence from Theorem 2.5, τ
∗ must satisfy
ˆ 1
τ∗
E
(
Nu
u
∣∣∣Fτ∗
)
du =
ˆ 1
τ∗
Nτ∗
τ ∗
du ≤ 1 (25)
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which is equivalent to Nτ∗ ≤ τ
∗/(1 − τ ∗). Here it is understood that we lose by
definition, if no such jump time τ ∗ exists for the process (Nu) T1≤u≤1, but if it exists
then we must stop according to Theorem 2.5. This agrees with equation (5.11) of
B. and Yor (2012), and proves their Theorem 5.1.
There is a major difference between the solution of this problem (l.a.p.), in which
each arrival time is a decision time, and the problem which we solved where only
record times are times where we have to take decisions. It is not hard to show that
the thinning in the latter implies nice continuity properties of our solution. If we
replace in ([0, 1]-time) the fixed threshold time 1/e by a slightly wrong threshold
time 1/e+ ǫ, then the loss is always small, namely pN(1/e)− pN(1/e+ ǫ) (see (2)),
and we know this already at time 0. The random win probability in the l.a.p. with
the history-driven optimal threshold determined by Nt ≤ t(1− t)
−1 is more sensitive
than the random optimal win probability in the 1/e-law, and lies, in contrast, always
below 1/e (for more details, see B. and Yor (2012)).
3.4 Implications
1. Applying the 1/e-strategy gives a random value, namely pN(1/e), where pn(x) is
given in (2). If we consider the N as a random variable in a well-defined (unknown)
probability space (and we are certainly free to do so), then the value pN(1/e) is for
us a random variable. Otherwise it is just an unknown value. We know from (3)
pN(1/e) > 1/e if N < ∞, and that pN (1/e) ≥ 1/e always holds. It makes no sense
to try to replace the random optimal payoff pN(1/e) by E(pN (1/e)). By definition
we cannot compute the latter.
One aspect of our result, and of our approach to obtain it, may attract our
attention. We are, for evident reasons, not used to speak of the maximization of a
random value or random variable, but here we are, at least to some extent, actually
forced to make sense out of it. The random variable or random value pN(1/e) is
the optimal payoff because we obtain it from the optimal strategy, which is, as we
proved, the 1/e-strategy. An optimal strategy should give (by definition) at any
instance of time optimal decision instructions since otherwise this would lead to
contradictions to the optimality principle. These optimal instructions were implied
by extensions in discrete time, and then continuous time, of the Odds-Theorem
for which there are no logical problems to understand optimality. Thus, viewing
consistency, elementary logic forces us to accept, at least in this case, the notion of
a random value in an optimal stopping problem.
As far as the author is aware, classical definitions of optimal stopping (see e.g.
Chow et al. (1971), Ferguson (2008, 2016), Ru¨schendorf (2016), Stirzaker (2015))
do not include this notion. More breadth in the definition, or at least some more
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flexibilty, could possibly be obtained by embedding, or at least linking, optimal
stopping problems, in, or with, other domains. Free boundary problems for instance
(see the well-chosen examples in the introduction section of the book by Peskir
and Shiryayev (2006)), do offer, as the author understands at least some flexibility
towards such a goal.
Somewhat simplified the author would say that it would be nice to have a defini-
tion of optimal stopping problems which includes the notion of value-free ”optimal
actions”. We pick up this discussion more generally in the forthcoming Section
4, where we give examples for (undeniably) optimal actions leading to (unknown)
optimal payoffs. .
Remark 3.2. We recall what we see in the proof of our main Theorem. The
dependence of future records on Gt reduces to dependence on t only. Records behave
in distribution as if we had started by assuming an improper uniform Laplace prior
for N leading to a Pascal process as shown in Bruss (1988). (For the characterization
of these interesting Pascal processes see Bruss and Rogers (1991).)
Now, the no-information hypothesis insisted on the complete lack of information,
whereas the improper Laplace prior for N implies that N is likely to be large. This
is far off the non-information hypothesis. How come?
The answer is that the non-informative uniform prior for N does not affect the
proportional increments property of (Nt)t≥T1 as long as we do not assume to know
an upper bound nu for N, because then Re´nyi’s Theorem (1962) renders with N ≥ 1
further information on N irrelevant. Thus, more generally, no model of ”learning”
about N could give us for our problem a decisive conclusion, and now we understand
why all previous attempts to solve the open question were bound to fail.
4 Optimal strategies without value
Having proven optimality of the 1/e strategy we explain why one must be careful
in dealing with problems under the hypothesis of no information. Indeed, it may,
as we have seen in the preceding Section, occur that a problem of optimal stopping
and/or optimal control has no value. Moreover, as we will show below, it may resist
any comparison of performance versus non-optimal strategies.
The following Lemma illustrates this in a simple form.
Lemma 4.1. In a model for problems of optimal stopping and/or optimal control
in a no-information setting, the following features are possible:
(i) An optimal strategy S solving the defined problem may exist indepen-
dently of whether one can attribute a value to S.
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(ii) If an optimal strategy S exists, it need not be the limit of ǫ-optimal
strategies as ǫ→ 0+.
Remark 4.2. In the way Lemma 4.1 is formulated, the statements (i) and (ii)
can be proven by examples having properties (i) and (ii). As said before, the no-
information last-arrival problem is such an example. However, the following simple
example suffices to make the point. We keep it in form of a an optimal control
problem in order to concentrate on the essence, but by adding costs for observations
we can change the example easily into a stopping problem.
Proof
(i) Let (I
(1)
j )j=1,2,··· and (I
(2)
j )j=1,2,··· be two sequences of Bernoulli random variables,
not necessarily independent of each other, and let p
(1)
j = P (I
(1)
j = 1) and p
(2)
j =
P (I
(2)
j = 1). At each time j the decision-maker (he, say) sees both p
(1)
j and p
(2)
j and
decides on which Bernoulli experiment he wants to bet (see Fig. 4). If he bets on
Line(1) he receives the random reward I
(1)
j , and, alternatively, if he bets on Line(2),
he receives the random reward I
(2)
j . At time j he sees only the two entries p
(1)
j and
p
(2)
j but none of the future values for j
′ > j.
Line (1) : p
(1)
1 p
(1)
2 p
(1)
3 · · · p
(1)
j · · · p
(1)
n
Line (2) : p
(2)
1 p
(2)
2 p
(2)
3 · · · p
(2)
j · · · p
(2)
n
Fig. 4
Denoting by π : N → {Line (1),Line (2)} the decision policy at each step, his
objective is to maximize for each n the expected accumulated reward. The optimal
strategy, if it exists, is defined by
π∗ = argmax
π
{
E
(
n∑
k=1
I
π(k)
k
)}
. (26)
But this implies that it does exists: in order to play optimally, it suffices to bet
at each step j on max {p(1)j , p
(2)
j }. Indeed, this strategy yields at each time n the
expected accumulated reward
M(n) = max {p
(1)
1 , p
(2)
1 }+max {p
(1)
1 , p
(2)
2 }+ · · ·+max {p
(1)
n , p
(2)
n }
upon which one cannot possibly improve because the maximum of a sum never
exceeds the sum of the maxima. And thus we have
M(n) =
n∑
k=1
max
{
p
(1)
k , p
(2)
k
}
≥ max
π
E
(
n∑
k=1
I
π(k)
k
)
. (27)
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(26) and (27) imply that the optimal strategy Sn maximizing the accumulated re-
ward until time n exists, but nevertheless, before time n, no value can be attributed
to the optimal Sn because M(n) is still unknown. This proves (i). (We note that if
the corresponding values in Line (1) and Line (2) never coincide, all Sn are moreover
unique. )
(ii) To prove (ii), look at the following modification. Suppose that at some time
t ∈ N a red light is switched on for Line (2), say, with probability δ. If the light is
switched on, the decision maker is supposed to be no longer entitled to bet on Line
(2). No information is given how often, or how long, the red light may be switched
on, given it is switched on at least once.
It is straightforward to check, similarly as above, that now the unique optimal
strategy is to bet, whenever possible, on the Line with the entry max{p
(1)
j , p
(2)
j }. If
δ = 0 then we are in the case (i). Further we see easily that, if
ℓ = lim
n→∞
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣p(1)j − p(2)j ∣∣∣ <∞, (28)
then, for any given ǫ > 0, we can always choose δ sufficiently small so that the
optimal strategy in this setting is ǫ-optimal with respect to S. Indeed, for all n
the difference in the accumulated rewards is bounded above by δℓ. In this case, the
optimal strategy can be seen as the limit of ǫ-optimal strategies.
If the limit ℓ in (28) satisfies ℓ =∞, however, then this is not possible.
In conclusion, we simply do not know whether the existing optimal strategy can
be seen as a limit of ǫ-optimal strategies, at least not in this class of ǫ-optimal
strategies. This does of course not exclude that one may still be able to find other
ǫ-optimal strategies.
However, the point we want to make is that special circumstances in a given
problem may naturally lead us to a certain class of ǫ-optimal strategies with which
we would like to study the problem. Then we should be able to count on some form
of ”closedness” as we know it from other domains of Mathematics. In Analysis for
instance, we require for good reasons that a function f : Rn → R allows a limit in
x ∈ Rn if and only if for all sequences (xm) → x we have f(xm) → f(x). As we
have just seen, without knowing that ℓ defined in (24) satisfies ℓ <∞, we would not
know whether all ǫ-optimal strategies would do as ǫ→ 0+.
4.1 Particularities of the no-information hypothesis
Lemma 4.1 tells us that we must (in contrast to the situation we found in the Unified
Approach setting for the problem we solved) keep, in more general cases, something
important in mind:
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In a setting of an optimal stopping problem under no-information an optimal strat-
egy need not have a ”neighborhood” in the set of possible strategies in a more
classical sense. An optimal expected payoff need not be a limit in an analytic sense
of the corresponding expected payoffs.
But then, any argument based on a continuity assumption, or on the existence of
a point of indifference for the optimal decision, etc., may become questionable. This
implies that we may, in certain cases, be able to show the optimality of a certain
strategy without being able to assess at the same time how a (slightly) suboptimal
strategy, or in fact any other strategy, would compare to the optimal strategy with
respect to performance. The modest content of what we say here is that we have
to be careful when speaking about indifference values, limiting performances or any
limit argument in the context of no-information.
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